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Last year’s International Collaboration Project had helped to highlight several key 
determinants of potential growth in the European Union (EU): basing upon growth accounting 
techniques, the main difference between the EU and the US had been shown not to rest on 
total factor productivity levels but, rather, on inputs per capita and, more specifically, on low 
employment levels in the EU. With this peculiar result in mind, investigating the bad 
employment performance of the EU had been the second step of last year’s Project: the main 
result had been that EU policymaking design was flawed and that prospects for growth would 
be improving only insofar as institutions like fiscal policy, the EU budget and monetary 
policy would be reformed. Finally, we had investigated the consequences of the last EU 
enlargement on the EU newcomers and on the other EU members. We had shown that the 
weight of these newcomers was so low that these countries could not be considered as a 
burden for the EU.  
Despite strong institutional turmoil in 2005, the EU has not been able to reform her 
institutions so far. In spring 2005, two countries – France and the Netherlands – rejected the 
“Constitutional Treaty” which was intended to give Europe clearer, more transparent and 
more democratic institutions. The French and Dutch ‘No’ to the referenda gave a sudden stop 
to the institutional debate and, more broadly, to the “construction of Europe”.  
At the end of 2005, the difficulties encountered to give the EU her budget testified for the 
gloomy prospects of EU institutions. Long and harsh discussions on the UK’s rebate – 
obtained in the Eighties, before the UK became a wealthy country – and the logic of “fair 
return”
1 have had continuous poisonous effects on the EU future: they have diverted public 
attention from the medium-term funding allocations to EU policies and to the fairest way of 
contributing financially to them.  
At the same time, the European Central Bank (ECB) has modified her nominal Repo rate for 
the first time since June 2003. Arguing that inflation pressures were looming and that GDP in 
                                                 
1 Mrs. Thatcher, claiming in 1979 that “(she) wanted (her) money back”, stands as a good example. For a 
comprehensive analysis, see J. Le Cacheux, “European Budget: the poisonous budget rebate debate”, Studies and 
Research no.41, Fondation Notre Europe, 2005 [http://www.notre-europe.asso.fr/IMG/pdf/Etud41-en.pdf].  
  3Europe were expected to be growth-oriented, the ECB raised the rate by 0.25 point. Though 
quite a low variation, it could be interpreted as a first step in the direction of monetary 
restrictiveness that may harm future growth prospects, most notably in Germany where the 
investment rate is already in a trough.  
As for national fiscal policies, they are still fettered by the dispositions of the Stability and 
Growth Pact, although the latter was reformed in March 2005. This reform has restated the 
primary objective of fiscal policy: a fiscal-target amounting to a maximum public deficit of 
3% of GDP and a debt-target of 60% of GDP. However, in the short run, these targets are now 
assessed with more flexibility than in the past: a broader set of “relevant factors” can be 
invoked to justify that the deficit limit has been exceeded. Among these “relevant factors”, 
one finds some reforms or specific expenditures which are intended to boost future growth: 
public expenditures in R&D and in education as well as public investment
2; but also so-called 
“structural reforms” (pension reforms, reforms of the welfare state, of labor markets, etc.). At 
least one obvious drawback with this “new” Stability and Growth Pact is that it does not leave 
sufficient margins for maneuver at the time-horizon needed to implement a new growth 
strategy hinging on innovation, R&D and education. As a matter of fact, the efficiency of 
these expenditures or of these reforms is always long to come and, meanwhile, governments 
implementing these strategies have to constrain other expenditures or to increase taxes, unless 
growth has rapidly resumed.  
Thus policymaking design in the EU has not dramatically changed over the recent period; and 
as we argued in last year’s Project, fiscal and monetary policies still pose a considerable 
challenge for the return of EU growth towards her potential.  
This reasoning does not abide by the current consensus in the EU; the consensus opposes the 
“imitation regime” and the “innovative regime”. The former has been followed by Europe for 
at least three decades during which EU countries have been catching up with the United States 
(US). In this regime, macroeconomic policies have to be aimed only at managing aggregate 
demand, while microeconomic management has to be limited to regulating firms and to 
promoting “national champions” in key sectors. Once countries have moved closer to the 
technology frontier, they aim at moving from the “imitation regime” to the “innovative 
regime”: innovation being the main engine of growth, reliance on new organizational forms, 
                                                 
2 The “new” Pact rejected the principle of adopting a Golden Rule of Public Finance in the EU: removing some 
types of public expenditures (say, public investment) from the deficit target is forbidden.  
  4greater mobility, greater labor market flexibility is crucial. As for macroeconomic public 
management, it has to be aimed at stability: stability makes firms’ environment more secure 
and less uncertain.  
The basis for such a dichotomy hinges extensively on an accessible steady state; it assumes 
equilibrium. The first essay of the Project, “Potential growth and structural changes: the 
European case”, has questioned the transition from one regime to the other. Rather than 
relying on steady-state dynamics, it has been devoted to a characterization of out-of-
equilibrium evolutions of the economy. The rate at which an economy can grow without 
inflationary pressures – the so-called potential growth rate – depends on the potential 
productivity growth. However, out of equilibrium, the dynamics of productivity is driven not 
only by long run, exogenous forces of technological progress and invention. It also reflects 
the process of transformation of the productive structure and the ability of agents and 
institutions to organize and to carry out this process within constraints set by economy-wide 
institutional features. Thus, the economy’s past and ongoing history contributes to 
determining its growth performance.  
Irregularity, seen as the effect of adjustments to real distortions more than the reflection of 
stochastic disturbances, is essential in the determination of the potential growth rate. 
Oscillations can no longer be treated simply as deviations from a fixed trend – the potential 
growth rate – determined beforehand by technology and institutions only. Rather, they are one 
way in which an out-of-equilibrium growth process materializes. Co-ordination failures affect 
productivity, investment and employment, all variables typically endogenous to a growth 
process. The chains of various events taking place in the shorter run exert an influence upon 
the economy’s potential rate of growth. Thus, discretionary economic policies – aimed at 
regulating existing dynamic mechanisms or at supplementing them with compensating 
mechanisms – are required to interact dynamically so as to correct distortions resulting from 
an external shock, and thus re-establishing the internal consistency of the economy to render 
smooth evolution viable again.  
Among the various empirical outcomes of this first essay, we may emphasize one in 
particular. EU economies have been classified vis-à-vis the US and Japan as regards their 
growth-path dependence. Growth regimes have been characterized by the comparison 
between gross capital formation and value-added, both evaluated in terms of employee: 
successive shifts in growth regime, between one with too much investment with respect to the 
  5value added and another, at the opposite, with too few investment, are meant to reveal the 
existence of recurrent distortions in the time structure of productive capacity, which are 
analyzed as the main cause of a declining potential growth rate. In the US case, data support 
the view of not-so-frequent regime shifts that testify for an overall stable behavior. Adopting a 
sectoral view, reallocation issues between domestic sectors are shown to be less important 
than coordination issues in explaining the differences in global performances between the US 
and European countries. It is therefore clear that, in this context, European countries 
necessitate more flexible policies than what they are in fact. Despite very low interest rates in 
Europe, past monetary policies, coupled with rigid and limited fiscal policies, have hampered 
the transition from one growth regime to another, more innovative one.  
The second essay, “Convergence and FDI in an enlarged EU: What can we learn from 
the experience of Cohesion countries for the CEECs?”, has been dedicated to the 
convergence process within the EU. In relation to the first essay, the EU newcomers are still 
obviously “out-of-equilibrium” or, at least, on a transition path towards a new steady-state. 
Distortions in the time structure of productive capacity have dramatically changed in the 
Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) since the Soviet Bloc has broken up. The 
profound transformation of these economies has been huge and convergence towards EU 
standards has accelerated the evolutions. Where the previous essay gave theoretical insights 
on the transition process between two growth regimes, the present essay has gathered a very 
large dataset which has never been exploited systematically in the literature. This dataset 
describes the transformation process of these economies, giving empirical insights on the 
sectoral classification of foreign investments and productivity levels.  
For the CEECs, there is in fact no tendency for convergence, either vis-à-vis EU-15 countries 
or within the CEECs’ group itself. Part of the explanation for this diverging pattern lies in the 
characteristics of investment and on the levels of foreign-direct investments (FDI). By 
characteristics, we mean the allocation of investments according to their geographical origin: 
domestic or foreign. In the latter case, it is generally shown that technological spillovers are 
large with multinational corporations (MNCs) adopting more up-to-date technologies than 
domestic ones; domestic companies then follow an imitation regime whereas MNCs introduce 
an innovative regime in the foreign economy. Lagging behind in terms of attractiveness of 
FDI or receiving FDI in sector with low potentials for growth is therefore shown to explain 
the current divergence of per capita GDP within the CEECs’ group as well as within the 
Cohesion group (Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal).  
  6Very interesting results are then drawn from a sectoral decomposition of the differences in 
productivity level between CEECs and Cohesion countries (excluding Ireland) and Ireland. 
The decomposition is based on a “level effect” – measuring the impact of different labor 
productivity levels in a specific sector when the shares of that sector are assumed to be the 
same across two countries – and a “share effect” which measures the differences in the 
industrial structures of the two countries. Outcomes are at least twofold: first, manufacturing 
sectors explain the bulk of the productivity gaps vis-à-vis Ireland; second, the “share effect”, 
though small, is unevenly distributed across countries. The Czech Republic, Slovakia and 
Hungary are thus shown to share almost the same industrial structure as the “Celtic Tiger”, 
whereas Poland is lagging behind. Adopting a decomposition of the manufacturing sector 
according to the level of technological intensity – from low tech to medium-high tech 
intensity –, labor productivity gaps vis-à-vis Ireland in medium/low technological industries 
are shown to have almost totally disappeared. Productivity gaps in medium/low technological 
industries remain substantial but data show that two CEECs (out of the four under study) 
emerge as possible competitor of Ireland: the Czech Republic and Hungary.  
So far, the Report has investigated the growth regimes in the largest EU-15 countries, as well 
as the convergence patterns of the largest CEECs, EU members since May 2004. Investment 
rates, FDI and labor productivity have been the key determinants to the various trends that the 
two first essays have disclosed. Demographic patterns are the next topic which should have 
major consequences on the potential growth of EU countries. In order to assess these 
consequences, an international dimension is required.  
The third essay, “World growth and international capital flows in the XXI
st century”, 
therefore broadens the EU perspective to embed the global economy. With a long-term view 
that complements out-of-equilibrium characterization more suited to a medium-term 
perspective, different scenarios are investigated with Version 2 of INGENUE model, a 
computable, general-equilibrium, multi-region world overlapping-generations model. The 
model allows for the determination of induced changes in the time profiles of world and 
regional aggregates, as well as for the corresponding constellation of current accounts and real 
exchange rate changes.  
Growth in the world economy is shaped by secular trends in its most structural long-run 
determinants, primarily changes in the demographic structure in the different parts of the 
world, and the diffusion of technological progress, as expressed by trends in total factor 
  7productivity growth. The demographic transition will imprint the first half of the XXI
st 
century. It is a sequential and lengthy process of ageing. The developed countries, the CEECs, 
Russia and a decade later China, are ageing from the top of the age structure. Most of the 
developing world is ageing from the bottom of the pyramid. The central intuition is that if the 
residents of developed countries most advanced in the ageing process were to rely on 
financial autarky and exclusively invest their additional saving (induced by pension reforms 
and ageing) in their home countries, it would generate a rise in the capital-labor ratio of 
production, leading to a decline in the marginal productivity of capital, hence in its rate of 
return. Financial globalization instead allows for a process of equalizing rates of return on 
capital worldwide, and retired households from developed countries would benefit from 
additional income from their investment abroad, while numerous working-age cohorts in less-
developed countries would benefit from a higher capital stock, hence a higher capital-labor 
ratio, therefore higher labor productivity and higher real wages. Financial globalization and 
international capital flows thus appear to allow for mutually advantageous, inter-temporal 
exchanges amongst regions of the world experiencing different timing in their ageing 
processes. The conditions for economic growth in the various regions of the world essentially 
depend on the interactions of the change in demographic structures and the process of 
differential convergence in total factor productivity, the latter resting on the diffusion of 
technological progress. 
The growth regime depicted in the scenarios depends on capital migration to the fast-growing 
economies rather than labor migration towards ageing wealthy economies. The capital flows 
involved substantiate an intergenerational savings transfer to the huge number of people in 
countries like China and India who aspire to get access to Western standard of life. This 
saving-investment pattern is therefore shown to be the only way for these countries to resume 
a convergence process interrupted by the financial crises of the Eighties and Nineties. The 
virtuous growth track that would be under way remains nevertheless conditional on 
considerable changes in the US and Europe. As for the US, a steady increase in savings rate is 
required in order to reduce the current account deficit to a more sustainable level. In Europe, 
higher prospects for potential growth are being required. They thus pose a considerable 
challenge to the EU institutions: as shown in the first essay, a more active monetary policy, 
coupled with higher investment in R&D and education, is crucially needed.  
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The rate at which an economy can grow without inflationary pressures – the so-called 
potential growth rate - certainly depends on the potential productivity growth. However, out 
of equilibrium, the dynamics of productivity is driven not only by long run, exogenous forces 
of technological progress and invention. It also reflects the process of transformation of the 
productive structure and the ability of agents and institutions to organize and to carry out this 
process within constraints set by economy-wide institutional features. Thus, the economy’s 
past and ongoing history jointly contribute to determining its current growth performance. So, 
the potential growth rate depends on the specific growth path that has been actually followed 
by the economy, rather than on the fundamentals characterising an assumed implicit steady 
state.  
Irregularity in the economy’s dynamics, seen hereafter as the manifestation of adjustment to 
real distortions more than the reaction to stochastic disturbances, and its level are essential in 
the determination of the potential growth rate. This essay presents an analytical framework 
that allows to identify such irregularities as they are associated with discontinuous changes in 
growth regimes and, moreover, to link them with the average performance of the economy as 
a whole. Within such framework, the higher degree of structural instability seen in large 
European countries may account for their poorer employment and productivity performance 
and their lower potential growth rate vis-à-vis the US as a benchmark. Hence, one is naturally 
driven to the conjecture that that bad performance might be attributed to some errors in the 
conduct of economic policy rather than to the “wrong” institutions. 
 
JEL codes:  
Key words: growth regime, potential growth, structural change, unemployment 
 
1. Introduction 
The issue confronting all large European economies of the Euro area, is how to recover full 
employment, and to maintain previously established social achievements. The common 
answer is growth and innovation, that is, accessing the most advanced technologies, as the 
way to revamp the growth process. As to how achieve this twofold goal, there is today a 
prevailing if not universal consensus a specific recipe, derived mainly from the unfavourable 
comparison with the performance of the US economy. This recipe consists in promoting the 
emergence of a new institutional framework aimed at enhancing potential growth rate and at 
reducing the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU). 
  10The desire to improve the poor European economic performance since the mid-1980s, which 
was behind the Single Market Programme and more recently led to the so-called Lisbon 
process, did not deliver its promised results. The late 1980s like the late 1990s years have 
seen the two unique episodes of relatively high growth of the past two decades. Overall, 
growth has slowed down since the early1980s in spite of the implementation of far-reaching 
reforms in both the macro-environment (e.g. the consolidation of public finances and lower 
inflation) and micro-environment (see the Single Market Programme, Uruguay Round and 
various labour market reforms). 
Macroeconomic performance of the EU has been disappointing with regard to the US. Instead 
of growing faster than the US through assimilation of existing technologies and organisational 
designs as in the post-war period, EU has achieved a lower growth rate and a higher 
unemployment rate than the US. This gap would be the result of structural deficiencies. 
According to the prevailing consensus, bad performance in Europe would be the effect of 
institutional mistakes that have prevented its economies from simultaneously reaching all the 
standard policy objectives: high growth rate, full employment, price stability and external 
balance. Europe would have been unable to enter the new age, i.e. the age of the so-called 
knowledge economy, despite huge transformations that have been taking place for many 
years. The consensus about this interpretation is built upon a theoretical framework that 
focuses on some structural properties of an economy, that is, mainly on technologies and 
institutional rules governing behaviours and working of its markets. Such framework 
maintains that macroeconomic interventions to assure stability and balanced public budgets 
are a preliminary step to those structural reforms that would favour innovation processes in a 
stable macroeconomic environment. With this belief, macro governance should consist in 
promoting separate and independent institutions, each one in charge of a sole objective: thus, 
the European Central Bank has to maintain price stability, and not be concerned with growth 
and employment issues; the Growth and Stability Pact is there to enforce fiscal deficit limits; 
and the competition policy is in the hands of the Commission with the task of promoting free 
trade and minimising monopolistic distortions. The structural reforms being promoted, on the 
other hand, are those reckoned to allow realizing a perfectly competitive market, with the 
focus on the labour market, whose rigidities are indicated as being the main obstacle to the 
smooth working of competition. This is the recipe proposed to make innovative choices, 
leading one up to the frontier of technological development, hence realising faster growth and 
full employment: the promised fruits of the so-called knowledge economy. 
  11Being a capitalist society, Europe has always been knowledge-based. Thus the question is will 
Europe be able to capture the potential gains of productivity associated with the development 
of new technologies and market extensions. This, in the macroeconomic conventional 
wisdom, is made to depend as we have just mentioned of the existence of given conditions 
assuring the required behaviours 
The substantial departures from all sorts of steady state-like behaviours exhibited by the larger 
European countries since the mid 70s, and by Japan from the early 90s, renders it 
conceptually difficult to maintain some of the fundamental propositions of conventional 
macroeconomic wisdom. First of all, there does not seem to be a unique attractor (an 
equilibrium path associated with the potential growth rate) towards which economies have 
been evolving, a unique path that would be defined by technological and institutional settings. 
Even in the long run, countries similar in terms of fundamentals (i.e. technology, preferences) 
do not seem to necessarily converge to the same steady state path with per capita income (a 
welfare measure) equalised across them. Oscillations can no longer be treated simply as 
deviations from a fixed trend – the potential growth rate - determined beforehand by 
technology and institutions only. Rather, they are one way in which an out-of-equilibrium 
growth process gets realised. Co-ordination failures affect productivity, investment and 
employment, all variables typically endogenous to a growth process. The chains of various 
events taking place in the shorter run exert an influence upon the economy’s potential rate of 
growth. Thus, active economic policies - aimed at regulating existing dynamic mechanisms, 
or at supplementing them with compensating mechanisms - are required to interact 
dynamically so as to correct distortions resulting from an external shock, and thus re-
establishing the internal consistency of the economy to render smooth evolution viable again. 
Here the principle is simple: the mix of interventions demanded is not to be implemented once 
and for all. It must be ready to be modified in real time, closely following and adapting to a 
process that, being hit by a variety of perturbations, takes on its shape and direction along the 
way. 
The current consensus prevailing both among academic circles and policy makers is in the 
main justified on the ground of to the distinction between economies undergoing a catching-
up process and economies already at the technology frontier (section 2). This viewpoint will 
be challenged with factual evidence of the growth processes in different countries, with the 
high likelihood of strong and pervasive phenomena structural changes (section 3). Differences 
of global performance among countries will be explained in terms of the properties of the 
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growth modelling framework will be revisited so as to give analytical expression to the notion 
of structural change. Then, an econometric model will be proposed that confirms the existence 
of structural changes associated with the volatility of investment (section 5). Given this new 
perspective, diversity in structural change phenomena will be attributed to the way in which 
economic policy influences the investment path (section 6). By way of conclusion, we will 
take up again the issue of the role of institutions (section 7). 
2. The prevailing consensus 
Conventional analysis of economic performance in Europe countries focus upon 
characterizing the properties of a certain attractor and links functionally long-run performance 
with the nature of technologies and institutions.  
In the first three decades after the World War II, Europe realised a remarkable catching-up 
process, combining high growth, full employment, and high levels of social protection. 
Institutions and policies then developed seem to have been appropriate to the conditions of the 
times and have met with the success just mentioned. The key idea prevailing today, on the 
other hand,  is that the ability of those institutions and structures to deliver growth and welfare 
performance has declined as the European economy was reducing its distance from the 
technological frontier. On the whole, those very institutions are now considered as obstacles 
to innovation: In short, institutions, which were appropriate for imitation, would not do for 
innovation. 
According to this view (Acemoglu, Aghion, Zilibotti 2002, Aghion, Howitt 2005), during 
three decades, Europe was catching-up with the US through investment and factor 
accumulation, and through imitation of leading-edge technologies. This corresponded to the 
generalisation of an already mature technology and well-known organisational designs, 
previously discovered and experimented in the US. In this context, significant economies of 
scale associated with standardised products resulted in industry structures dominated by large 
firms partly protected both in product and financial markets.  These firms developed long-
term relations with suppliers of fund. They also offered long-term relations and job security to 
their workers. New entry and the competitive drive that it gave were not crucial. In this 
context, macroeconomic policy was aimed at only manage the aggregate demand. 
Microeconomic management was reduced to regulate firms operating in industries 
characterized as natural monopolies and to promote national champions in some other 
industries without really considering competition issues. 
  13According to this view (as in Acemoglu, Aghion, Zilibotti 2002, Aghion, Howitt 2005), 
during three decades, Europe has been successfully catching-up with the US through 
investment and factor accumulation, as well as through imitation of leading-edge 
technologies. This had implied the generalised adoption of a mature technology and well-
known organisational designs, previously discovered and well experimented in the US. In 
such context, significant economies of scale associated with standardised production resulted 
in industrial structures dominated by large firms that were partly protected both in product 
and financial markets. These firms developed long-term relations with financial suppliers, at 
the same time as offering long-term relations and job security to their workers. New entry and 
the competitive drive that it came with it, were not considered to be crucial. In this context, 
macroeconomic policy was aimed only at managing aggregate demand. Microeconomic 
management was limited to regulating firms operating in natural monopoly industries and to 
promoting national champions in other industries, without any real concern for competition 
issues. 
Going with this view, this system was to break down as the patterns of both consumption and 
production shifted towards different types of goods and services, more customized and 
requiring a different form of industrial organisation. Briefly, “once European countries had 
moved closer to the technology frontier and also with the occurrence of new technological 
revolutions in communication and information, innovation at the frontier (would have) 
become the main engine of growth. This in turn called for new organisational forms, less 
vertically integrated firms, greater mobility, both intra- and inter-firm, greater flexibility of 
labour markets, a greater reliance on market finance and a higher demand for both R&D and 
higher education. However, these necessary changes in economic institutions and 
organisations have not yet occurred on a large scale in Europe and it is this delay in adjusting 
our institutions, which account to a large extent for our growth deficit” (Sapir Report 2003, p. 
29).  
This interpretation translates into the following key conditions for removing the poor record 
of jobs’ creation in Europe. To the extent that rivalries among firms and strong fluctuations in 
their market shares make it easier to innovate at the frontier, the new growth paradigm 
mandates to eliminate all obstacles to rivalry and a free entry. A regulatory environment must 
encourage start-up firms, be conducive to the challenging of established positions, and 
stimulate entry like exit. 
  14To the extent that selection among projects as well as among more or less skilled managers is 
needed for sustain innovation at the frontier, the new growth paradigm would require 
developing stock markets and promoting its own mode of governance so as to guarantee the 
ability for innovators to appropriate a large fraction of revenues from their innovation. 
Finally, to the extent that microeconomic instability, and hence hiring and firing of employees 
are the main aspects of an innovation process, the new growth paradigm would require to 
facilitate matching supply and demand for the different skills in different industries and 
different localisations and enabling firms to hire and fire employment more easily. This in a 
nutshell will be the cure for the poor record of jobs’ creation in Europe. 
In this context, far from being the result of a well managed process of change, macro-stability 
(in the sense of low inflation and balanced budget) appears as its pre-condition. Then, macro-
stability is regarded as the result of obeying to a set of rules or behaviours achieving monetary 
stability and fiscal discipline, rules given once for all, being supposedly efficient whatever the 
time moment they are applied. 
Implicit in the above argument is the assumption that a unique attractor be associated with 
each set of technologies and institutions toward the economy is supposed to converge
3. 
Several attractors may exist, though, which implies that economies have to choose among 
them, e.g., between low growth with high unemployment or else high growth and low 
unemployment.  
Accordingly, current bad performance of the economies of large countries in Europe are 
imputed a shift in the steady state generated by to the fact that institutions inherited from the 
catching-up period would no longer be suited to innovation requirements. Within this 
framework, which is typical of standard growth analysis, investment is basically factor 
demand that is technically determined with productivity gains exogenously or endogenously 
given. Thus, falling productivity gains due to the wrong or un-matching institutions 
automatically would generate a falling in investment as well as in employment.  
Indeed, according the most extreme defenders of this common consensus, “a critical point has 
been reached in a number of European countries, not so much because of overall 
macroeconomic performance (the current slowdown is milder than the previous one) but 
because of budgetary problems (including the adverse consequences of labour markets 
                                                 
3 However this analysis contradicts the standard model that focuses on perfect competition and flexible prices as 
a condition of a successful catching-up process. 
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long-run living standards) and the feeling that ‘globalisation’ is making the burden of labour 
rigidities unbearable” (EEAG Report 2004 p. 3). This is taken to render all the more necessary 
and urgent the carrying out of structural reforms in the labour markets. In this direction, the 
only obstacle is assumed to be a political one: the main beneficiaries of the existing system 
have the capacity of blockading reforms reducing or even eliminating their rent revenues. So, 
at stake is the need to identify a set of policies to reduce unemployment that could face a 
sensibly lower political opposition. “This includes liberalising product markets; introducing a 
simple ‘firing tax’ that would be paid to the worker as severance payment instead of the 
current system of legal procedures; replacing welfare payments for the poor with in-work 
benefits such as earned income tax credits; and ensuring that the search activity of the 
unemployed be tightly monitored with sanctions in the form of reduced benefits of search if 
not active” (ibid. p. 3). Moreover, if measures to improve the Stability and Growth Pact are 
insufficient or hard to carry out, the EU member states should introduce an institutional 
reform consisting in delegating “the actual decision-making regarding variations of actual 
public deficits or specific taxes around levels determined by the Parliament to an independent 
Fiscal policy Committee” (ibid. p. 7).  
The viewpoint synthesised above, can and must be challenged first from an empirical and 
historical viewpoint. Reconstruction and catching-up cannot be assimilated to any process of 
steady growth. Most of the difficulties that European economies faced in this period, are those 
met by any economies engaged in an innovation process properly defined as an out-of-
equilibrium process: they are linked to changes in the structure of productive capacity that 
bring about co-ordination issues. On the other hand, macroeconomic policy in this same 
period is far from being simply aggregate demand management. It was also, and mainly, 
policy that successfully managed the supply side of the economy thanks to an appropriate 
management of productive (financial and human) resources (Hicks, 1959). Finally, during the 
two last decades, structural reforms and the adoption of fixed policy rules have not prevented 
increasing unemployment and productivity slowdown in the European countries. 
3. Challenging the consensus: the evidence of structural changes 
The current consensus about the actual causes of low growth with high unemployment in 
large European countries is questioned by the observation of the structural instability 
prevailing in those countries both at the macro and at the sectoral levels. Such instability 
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stochastic disturbances.  
Hence, the key issues to be addressed might do not revolve around the existence and the 
possibility of convergence towards some pre-determined path of equilibrium growth. They are 
about the nature of growth regimes in the history of those economies and their relevant 
stability features. We have to recall some theory, here. 
While conventional growth theories focus upon equilibrium paths, reckoned as steady states, 
sequential growth theories focus on out-of-equilibrium paths. In  parallel, current econometric 
techniques estimate long run steady states interpreted as potential growth rates, while 
sequential theories look for statistical investigations aimed at identifying the manifold variety 
of growth patterns and linking them to the average performance of the whole economy.  
Böhm and Punzo (2001) go along a similar statistical investigation with a basically 
preliminary classificatory exercise. As explained in the Appendix 1, they bring in a 
descriptive framework (called the Framework Space, FS) where real economies may appear 
not to comply to any standard growth model or be stable about any specific qualitative 
behaviour. On the contrary, they may alternate between different regimes (a tantamount for 
growth models) which are defined in terms of the relative behaviours of the two growth 
variables in intensive form of the standard theories (productivity and investment growth rates, 
both per employed). Given a partition of dynamics into a finite set of regimes, a string of 
visited regimes defines a growth pattern
4. Such patterns (or trajectories defined in the space of 
regimes) and paths (or regimes) coincide only if there is a stationary solution in the 
conventional state space and this is an attractor. Changes in regime are interpreted as 
instances of structural change, and such changes may or may not be related one with another 
in a specific sequence.  
Therefore, the shorter run fluctuating view presented in this way, contrasts with the prevailing 
long run picture of the growth phenomenon where a time-stable (often, averaged) state (or 
else a finite set of them, local attractors) is sought for. The focus of the foregoing narrative 
upon intensive features is meant to isolate what are believed to be qualitative properties, those 
on which in fact growth theory concentrates when doing cross-country analysis. 
                                                 
4 Record being kept of the time spent in each such regime, that defines a relative stability property (see Day 
1993, 1994, 1998). We call it a string with reference to the code representation proposed in Brida, Puchet and 
Punzo 2001.
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prevailing patterns (if there are any) and for emerging instances of structural or regime 
fluctuations. As we shall see later, an index can be attached to each of them, indicating the 
degree of embodied irregularity. The relation between such index and the potential growth 
rate as usually calculated may give insights about the determination of the latter.  
Making use of this framework, and taking stock of a mobile panorama of employment, 
productivity and accumulation trends, rather than purely quantitative differences we pin down 
differences in what we will call country growth regimes, as well as in their dynamic patterns 
(i.e. structural fluctuations). Such diversity is closely related to the nature and profile of the 
accumulation process. 
In fact, the central stylised fact revealed by international comparisons is the diversity of 
evolution of countries though they have been confronted with the same kind of shocks and 
had access to the same technology: Moreover the EU countries are markedly different from 
the US (set of figures 1). As for the latter economy, there is no clear trace of significant 
changes in growth regime during the last two decades, one of them in particular –regime 6 - 
seems to be prevailing over time (and across disaggregated sectors of that economy) 
exhibiting a (unusual) degree of stability. Quite at the opposite, most of the European 
countries as well as Japan exhibit wild and recurrent changes in growth regimes.  
To consider structural change as the basis for the diverse stability properties of the various 
countries, we take advantage of one feature of the FS: it naturally accommodates a 
disaggregated descriptive statistics. So, in the following we will look at the set of figures 
showing the multi-sector histories of the US, some of the EU countries, and Japan (set of 
figures 2). Each figure is a movie with photograms taken at given dates (here determined by 
the phases of the business cycle) and they show the distribution of growth paths of the sectors 
of a given economy.  
A glance across the set of figures shows how hard it is to support analysis based upon the 
assumption of the existence of a single attractor, both within a single country (given the high 
dispersion of sectors across regimes) as well as across countries, and the high time variability 
of the same distribution at both levels. Steady state-like behaviours, if they make it to emerge 
in aggregative analysis, must be the result of a twofold optical deformation, aggregation over 
sectors and averaging over time. 
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compared to the European countries, thus confirming on its turn stability in the new regime 
redefinition at the centre of our interpretative scheme. Looking in fact the movie of the US 
economy, we find sector paths dispersion that, with a moderate variability over time and 
special episodes, still depicts a cloud basically lingering in the first quadrant of the FS, some 
episodes of sector invasion of the 2nd quadrant being limited to small groups and for a limited 
time period. The aggregate pictures previously shown are therefore good synthetic 
approximations of this more detailed, structurally dynamic representation. 
Measuring structural instability via some index of the distance between barycentres of the 
clouds of sectoral paths (see appendix), it appears that France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands 
and even United Kingdom exhibit a stronger instability than the US (table hereafter and 
figures 3). 
Table. Mean Distance Between Barycentres 







United Kingdom  0.0714 
United States  0.0273 
The contrast with the histories of any of the European countries’ could not be more evident. 
No similar behaviour is a there, higher variability and greater mobility of the sector 
distribution lie behind their higher regime instability in the aggregate. This said, we can 
address the question whether, nevertheless, there is some observed tendency among EU 
countries, or a subset of them, to approach (converge) to similar dynamics, defined in the 
broader sense of regime dynamics. From this point of view, indeed, it seems to emerge that at 
least for two countries, Germany and France, this has been happening over the time span 
covered by the graphs, up to the end of the 90s starting with the second half of the seventies. 
This, in other word, seems to have been happening after the end of the Golden Age, while as 
said, Europe generally speaking was seeing its distance from the US increasing. Taking a look 
at the whole cloud of sector paths distribution, after a common start and with a phase led by 
France, the two countries seem to persist on a fluctuation between various regimes. Given the 
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structural cycle with a sequence of alternating regimes: thus, convergence in our broader 
sense, to a regime pattern or fluctuations rather than to a single path. This seems to be 
confirmed by the sharp contrast with pictures like e.g. that of Italy, where the regime pattern 
seems to exhibit entirely different properties, both as to sequence and phasing. Japan’s movie 
adds to the variety of the regime experiences that have to be considered. 
4. Structural instability and global performance 
One is naturally led to conjecture that the higher degree of structural instability seen in the 
large European countries, may account for their poorer employment and productivity 
performance and their lower potential growth rate vis-à-vis the US (Gaffard, Punzo 2005). 
Within the present framework, the widespread, and apparently increasing, instability in terms 
of regimes observed across sectors like across countries, may account for the their 
differentiated performance as seen through key variables like the potential growth rate or the 
unemployment rate. 
A quick glance at the graphs shows that a reduction in the average growth rate of productivity 
goes hand-in-hand with deeper structural fluctuations.  
A simple exercise shows that the economies exhibiting higher growth rate of the GDP are also 
those that manifest weaker volatility of investment measured by the ratio of standard 
deviation to mean (appendix table 1).  
Plotting the index of instability against the variation of the employment rate or the variation of 
productivity gains, we get the expected negative correlation between structural instability and 
global performances (figures 4). 
Plotting the growth rate against a switch ratio (i.e. the ratio of the number of times the 45° line 
is crossed to the number of observations) we get a negative correlation between a form of 






















hUsing the evolution of barycentres as an indicator of structural changes implies, of course, the 
loss of relevant information about the behaviour of the various sectors. Thus, to complete the 
analysis, we compute the standard deviation of the distribution σ gv(t) and σgi(t). Then, we 
have built the phase diagram σ gv(t)/σ gi(t). We can observe a sort of close loop within a 
limited range of values in the US case that does not show up for any other country (figures 6). 
This could be considered as supporting evidence of a more stable behaviour.  
The previous analysis does not give information about what happened to single sectors along 
the way. Similar dispersions of these standard deviations may be compatible with very 
different time profiles of the sectoral  paths in the phase space. Simply looking at the 
evolution of clouds shows that, in the case of the US, such clouds remain quite dispersed 
around the origin, while in the case of large European countries almost all sectors move 
together up and down from   to   and vice-versa. This suggests the existence, in 
the latter case, of a dominant macroeconomic structural cycle. 
gi > gv gv > gi
On the other hand, computation of σ gv(s) and σ gi (s) does not indicate real behavioural 
differences at sector levels among the different countries (figures 7). The computation of the 
ratio between the dispersion over time of employment in sector s and its mean value 
σe(s)/me(s) gives similar results: there is no real differences in terms of employment 
mobility among the different countries (figure 8). Hence, we take this as supporting the view 
that reallocation issues seem to be less important than co-ordination issues in explaining the 
differences in global performances. 
Summing-up. These investigations show that high regime instability across sectors makes an 
economy a natural candidate to exhibit low potential growth rates and high NAIRU. Given 
such empirical relation, the commonly entertained view is no longer acceptable, that imputes 
poor performance entirely to changes in the nature of technical progress that were not 
supported by a new adequate institutional framework. 
5. Towards a new model of economic growth  
The empirical analysis carried on above requires an analytical background capable to take into 
account the features of an economy where traverse behaviour is endemic.  
The first model to be considered in the background is the Kaldor’s model of economic growth 
(Kaldor 1961). As is well known, the main difference between Solow and Kaldor models is 
that, in the former investment is nothing but factor demand univocally determined once 
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equations, investment depending on productivity and productivity depending on investment. It 
is the specific form chosen for the so-called technical progress function (the productivity 
equation) that led Kaldor to describe only a steady state. In any other formulation of such 
equation, economic dynamics is much more complex and can be characterized by the changes 
in growth regimes previously analysed.  
Standard growth theory does not investigate in depth the relationship between investment and 
productivity; as the latter is substantially given by exogenous technical coefficients, the 
relationship is one way, from productivity growth to investment decisions. In fact, the 
richness of such a relationship fully emerges only when the economy goes through transitions 
between steady states, typically associated with disequilibria in at least one market. Actual 
productivity will then cease to be a purely technological phenomenon, to become the result of 
a complex set of influences, among which investment is crucial. 
Another possible reference framework is the Neo-Austrian model, initially proposed by Hicks 
(1973), and more recently developed by Amendola and Gaffard (1998, 2003).  
In the words of Neo-Austrian analysis, the typical dynamics of an economy can be 
characterised by two predominant phases: a phase in which there exists a bias towards 
construction of the productive capacity (i.e. in the FS, corresponding to regime 6) when the 
growth rate of investment per employee exceeds the growth rate of productivity, and a phase 
in which the bias is towards the utilisation (regimes 2 or 3), productivity gains going hand-in-
hand with comparatively lower investment growth rate. In fact, the pattern previously 
identified offers support to this analytical approach that focuses on the temporal dimension of 
the production process and its qualitative articulation in interconnected phases.  
While changes in fundamentals (and in the institutional rules that influence those 
fundamentals) would only introduce a shift along the main diagonal (where the growth rate of 
labour productivity is equal to the growth rate of investment per employee), that is, a change 
in the productivity growth rate (i.e. in the property of a unique attractor), only maladjustments 
and persistent distortions in the structure of productive capacity can account for structural 
fluctuations and hence a correspondingly decreasing average growth rate. As a matter of fact, 
successive shifts in growth regime, between one characterised by excessive investment with 
respect to value added and another characterised, at the opposite, by too little of it, reveal the 
underlying presence of recurrent distortions in the time structure of the productive capacity, 
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have to find the determinants of such volatility. 
The Neo-Austrian approach revolves around three analytical hypotheses: (a) production is 
characterized by irreversibilities (complementarity) and time-to-build; (b) expectations are 
generally backward looking, an assumption justified by the complexity of transition paths, 
and by the ensuing burden associated with the computation of a rational expectations 
equilibrium; (c) markets do not necessarily clear, and as in the temporary equilibrium 
tradition, rationing occurs. The joint effect of this set of hypotheses is the characterization of 
transition as a sequence of disequilibria, whose shape crucially depends on institutional and 
policy variables. Using this model it is for example easy to show how the productivity gains 
associated to technological improvements are not inevitable, but require adequate investment 
and the institutional environment necessary for this investment to be successful. Lacking these 
conditions, the transition may lead to low activity outcomes and explain for example the 
‘productivity paradox’ of the 1970s and 1980s (Amendola, Gaffard and Saraceno, 2005). In 
the Neo Austrian framework investment decisions depend on demand expectations (in turn 
determined by current and past conditions), on monetary conditions, that may be seen as a 
broad approximation to the existence of credit constraints, and on prices (and wages). On the 
other hand productivity depends on demand conditions, on investment, on wages and prices, 
and on the structure of productive capacity.  
In what follows, which is an attempt to pursue along this line of thought, most of these 
elements play a role in identifying the two relationships that appear in the framework space. 
We consider two basic relationships, one is a productivity function, the other is an investment 
function. The estimation of parameters of a simple growth model consisting of these two 
equations has shown a reasonable degree of association between productivity growth and 
investment intensity growth, governed by exogenously given price variables. Applying a clear 
separation between regimes where the investment growth variable exceeds productivity 
growth and where the opposite is the case has improved the degree of explanation. Although 
testing for equality of individual parameters across regimes can often not reject equality, we 
find that simultaneous testing of all parameters always rejects equality clearly.  The separation 
between the two regimes appears to be relevant (Böhm 2005 b). 
 By using smooth transition regression models, given the set of linearly specified equations, 
we re-specify the model thereby trying to improve upon the statistical properties (see 
appendix 5). With French data, testing the productivity equation and the investment intensity 
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variable for the productivity equation and the third order lagged intensity for the investment 
equation. In the productivity growth equation we observe a slowly changing set of parameters 
of the lagged dependent variable as well as wage and price changes. In the investment 
equation the parameters of the lagged logs of investment intensity turn out to be relevant only 
after the late eighties with some interruptions: the transition function jumps after 1989 and 
stays close to a value of one with some interruptions in 1994 and 1998 (Böhm 2005 a.). 
When investigating how both dependent variables react to shocks to this small non linear 
system, a fact previously described comes out very neatly, i.e. that the amplitude of cycles is 
much greater in the investment than in productivity growth (ibid.). 
This econometric investigation brings to the surface the existence of a path dependency 
phenomenon, when lagged investment intensity growth plays an essential role in the evolution 
profile. By the way, it is not really amazing that the rate of interest does not play such a role: 
insofar as successive investments must be regarded as a bundle of complements, a drastic 
change in investment spending, which would occur in a given period, will be determined by 
the available liquidity rather than by the cost of capital. 
6. Economic policy, investment volatility, and potential growth 
In fact, we have to explain why regime instability may occur, and in fact it does occur. We 
maintain that it cannot result from the misalignment between new technology and old 
institutions. We have to look at the impact of co-ordination failures associated with out of 
equilibrium behaviours and affecting the profile of investment path. 
Most European countries, and notably France, Germany and Italy, experienced fairly irregular 
growth from the late 70s onwards. As we have seen, this took the form of alternating growth 
regimes, itself the likely consequence of co-ordination failures. 
 The 80s, as the major shortcoming of economic policy, have seen the emergence of tight real 
constraints, which implied that any recovery would generate inflation pressures and boost 
inflation expectations. This was taken to point toward restrictive monetary policies. In reality, 
the lack of productive resources following the first negative (oil prices), then positive 
(technological) supply shocks has to be deemed responsible for stagflation. Restrictive 
monetary policies implemented with the aim of drastically bringing down a rate of inflation 
already perceived too high, had the joint effect of rendering the productive resource 
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- productivity framework space, have been their typical outcome. On the whole, such 
structural instability factored out into a productivity slowdown, diminishing potential growth 
and a rising NAIRU. To interpret this crucial episode of the recent economic history in the 
developed countries, we think there is no need to call for an exogenous decrease in 
productivity gains that would have been misinterpreted or not immediately perceived, with a 
consequent fall in potential growth and increase of the NAIRU. 
Later, during the 1980s and the 1990s, bringing down inflation became the explicit goal of 
monetary policy in Europe. A stable price level and above all a strong exchange rate 
(particularly in France) became primary policy objectives, to be pursued with a restrictive 
monetary policy, and eventually a lower inflation process did prevail. This led to a remarkable 
nominal convergence. But what was the impact of monetary stability on economic growth? 
Evidence points out to lower investment and lower growth rate as the main effects of such a 
stabilisation. Liquidity constraints remained high on one side of the Atlantic, while being 
more relaxed on the other. In the EU-area to come, against the need for a more intense 
accumulation of capital, investment was instead sacrificed, with the consequence of 
progressively lowering the notional growth rate that could be compatible with a non-
accelerating inflation. Economic policies proved to be inappropriate to the point of being 
actually responsible for the ensuing, both irregular and slow, growth performance. 
As a matter of fact, accumulation and the restructuring of productive capacity following a 
supply shock are characterized by co-ordination problems concerning in the first place the 
production process but extending to the whole economic activity (Amendola and Gaffard 
1998, 2003). The main feature of the problem is the insufficient investment in productive 
capacity relative to the requirements of an economy facing technological changes to be 
maintained in a quasi-steady state at full employment. In a fully co-ordinated economy, the 
required investment would be immediately and spontaneously carried out without inflation or 
unemployment. In situations other than this ideal one, an external intervention is necessary to 
control inflation pressures and to absorb unemployment. The main problem to be dealt with, 
is to provide the flow of productive resources required over time and thus to keep a balanced 
structure of productive capacity, progressively eliminating market imbalances. The process of 
restructuring of productive capacity necessarily results in inflationary pressures (and/or 
deficits in the trade balance in open economies) because the goods in which wages will be 
spent cannot be provided out of the product of the labour that is newly employed.  
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with the consequence of exacerbating the initial, negative impact of the shock on output and 
employment. In this case, the investment necessary to accomplish the innovation process 
cannot be realized. We have less production and less demand for labour. This may in fact 
result in a lower inflation or even in price deflation and cumulative unemployment. This is, 
actually, the recent experience of the main European countries, as the result of policies 
implemented to comply with the Maastricht rules while the European Central Bank (ECB) 
only pursuing the target of price stability. In conclusion, restrictive monetary policy has been 
one of the major obstacles of a successful transition to the a new growth steady state because 
it has been at the root of an inappropriate volatility of investment spending. Moreover, 
targeting (and realising) a too low rate of inflation has made it impossible to reduce real 
interest rates and so favouring the growth process.  
Here, it is worth mentioning what happened on the both sides of Atlantic at the end of the 90s. 
So far as the corporate sector is concerned, the common belief that the United States 
experienced a much bigger bubble than the euro area is false. During the late 1990s, European 
companies went on an even bigger borrowing and investment binge than did corporate 
America. Total corporate investment (capital and financial) in the euro area rose from 14% of 
GDP in 1997 to 24% in 2000, eclipsing America investment boom. European firms’ 
corporate-financing gap (investment minus internal funds) rose from 4% of GDP in 1997 to a 
record 14% in 2000 and most of that was met by debt rather than equity finance. Corporate 
debt has risen much more dramatically than in America, from 60% of GDP in 1997 to 76% in 
2002. This legacy of over-borrowing and over-investment is currently holding back growth in 
the euro zone. 
Alternatively, the central bank might have opted for an accommodating monetary policy with 
the acceptance of a transitory inflation in order to enhance the growth process in the future, 
then simultaneously re-absorbing inflation and unemployment. In this case, the possibility of 
keeping a balanced structure of productive capacity would have helped re-establishing the co-
ordination of economic activity and making the innovation process viable, with positive 
results in terms of productivity and employment (Amendola and Gaffard 1998, 2003).  
In fact, if we look again at the European experience, a substantial loosening of monetary 
conditions in late 1980s and then late 1990s has preceded the two sole episodes of relatively 
high growth of those decades.  
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European growth, with Europe really facing a structural change. While European policy 
makers (and distinguished scholars) like to blame all the euro area’s economic woes on 
inflexible labour markets and high taxes, the more important difference between EU and the 
US with respect to their relative performances is that over the past three years the US has 
taken advantage of much looser monetary and fiscal policy bolstering consumer spending. 
Adjusting for the impact of the economic cycle (deficits widen in downturns as tax revenues 
shrink), the US structural budget has shifted from a surplus of 1% of GDP in 2000 to an 
estimated deficit of 4% this year. Over the same period, the euro area has seen no net fiscal 
stimulus. Interest rates have fallen by 5.5 percentage points in US twice, the fall in Euro area. 
A weaker dollar is also helping to boost the US’s exports and company profits. The combined 
stimulus has helped to cushion what otherwise could have proved a much steeper downturn in 
the United States. 
Of course current poor performance of the European economies cannot be attributed to 
current monetary policy that involves very low real interest rate. But it must be underlined 
underlined that the present state of these economies bears a strong mark from what happened 
in their past, i.e. to the previous investment decisions that have indeed been constrained by 
tight monetary policies. Path dependency is essential. When monetary policy only targeting 
inflation creates undue constraints on investment, the growth rate of output compatible with 
zero inflation will be lower and lower, and the NAIRU will be progressively increase along 
business cycles. It is clearly this that happened to the large European countries during the last 
decade of the twentieth century. 
As a matter of fact, structural reforms, whether relevant or not, open a transition phase whose 
main feature is a higher unemployment rate and  lower nominal (and real) wage rate. Instead 
of enhancing the potential growth rate, such reforms, may aggravate investment volatility and 
feed structural fluctuations, which reduce the potential growth rate and increase the NAIRU. 
Thus, even when and if some of these reforms were necessary, they must be carried out when 
a suitable macroeconomic policy will be carried out and generate a sustainable recovery.  
Out of equilibrium, the nature of the initial shock matters definitely less than the co-ordination 
issues arising as its consequence and the way the latter are dealt with. The fluctuations that 
characterise the out-of-equilibrium evolution of the economy, in other words, are not so much 
due to technology or changes in preferences as they reflect the co-ordination problems arising 
in a process of structural change. To reduce the amplitude of those fluctuations, representing 
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deal with those issues. One suspects that this was not the case in large European countries, 
both for political and doctrinal reasons. 
7. Conclusion 
Reference to the comparison of the US and Europe’s performances, which is today the 
leitmotiv of all arguments on economic policy, confirms a scenario focusing upon co-
ordination failures that we have drawn.  
On the one hand, the poor growth and productivity performance in Western Europe is the 
result of a slowed down process of accumulation (characterised also by strong fluctuations) 
due to a tight monetary policy, and more generally to wrong policy management. On the other 
hand, a stable and substantial rate of investment is behind the positive productivity trend in 
the U.S. Ex post, this is an obvious explanation of the difference. But behind those different 
accumulation processes, different co-ordination mechanisms have been at work, one actually 
sustaining this process, the other failing to do so. Different co-ordination involve the 
harmonisation over time of all the magnitudes involved in the adjustment process. 
No doubt, institutions do matter. However, they have to be considered in relation to the 
adjustment process required by structural changes, rather than in relation to a pre-assumed 
performance in the long run. “Their role has to be altogether redefined, to be one of helping 
reducing the irregularity in the growth process generated by e.g. technology shocks and 
generally innovation, rather than in determining the growth trend. They do contribute to the 
latter by accomplishing the former task. Effective institutional systems contribute to regular 
dynamic patterns, not those that just incorporate stronger incentives for growth. The reason is 
that  innovation in its variety of forms is by its very nature a break up and implies a 
discontinuity: e.g. a break up in the existing production structure and markets. It brings about 
adjustment costs and specific problems of coordination between economic activities. 
Depending upon the way these new problems are dealt with, an economy’s growth is more or 
less regular and accordingly the productivity and output gains ripped out of innovation greater 
or smaller. The challenge is to render the technological and institutional evolution as gradual 
as possible. This being their appropriate role, economic policy need only go the same way” 
(Gaffard, Punzo, 2005). 
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  30Appendix 1 
The Framework Space 
Our analytical framework is based upon variables (gross capital formation, value added and 
employment), which are relevant in the growth literature. They are manipulated so as to 
obtain growth rates from levels, often taken sectorally and/or regionally disaggregated. The 
rate of growth of value added and the rate of growth of gross fixed capital formation, both 
evaluated in terms of employee or per operative. Taken together, they are employed to index a 
growth path, of the economy as a whole or of a single sector, depending upon the level of data 
aggregation chosen. Such a path is a state in a plane endowed with axes called the Innovation 
and Accumulation axes, in the conventional order. On the former we write the growth rate of 
the GDP or sectoral value added per person employed, one of several possible indicators of 

























  31A trajectory in this plane is a sequence of dated states: the growth paths of conventional 
theories. States are dated according to a certain clock; this chosen, a state represents the 
average growth path of an economy over the corresponding date. The novelty in comparison 
to the conventional approaches is that a path is observed here via two variables. In addition, 
the dynamic evolution is reconstructed patching together a set of growth paths, and a 
trajectory looks like a segmented trend. Trajectories and paths coincide only if any of the 
latter is a stationary solution and an attractor. 
Finally, a regime is a set of growth paths that are generated by the same standard model. 
Invoking standard explanations of growth and productivity dynamics, six such regimes can be 
distinguished, plus one special Harrodian generalised path, or corridor. A ratio between the 
two growth rates exactly one corresponds to all paths belonging to this Harrodian set. This set 
and the other semi-axes, are used to induce a partition of the co-ordinate plane into dynamical 
regimes. In the regime 1, corresponding to the area below the Harrodian corridor in the first 
quadrant, all paths show positive productivity growth rates exceeding positive investment 
growth rates. The set above the corridor, where productivity falls behind investment growth, 
is the regime 6. With the quadrants numbered clockwise, beginning with the regime 1 - and 
observing that the positive and the negative quadrants are further subdivided by the Harrodian 
corridor - a classification is obtained: with no. 2 associated with negative investment growth 
rates but positive productivity growth, while the remaining three regimes are mirror images of 
those just described. It is only when the co-ordinate plane is endowed with such theory-
induced partition that it makes sense to call it Framework Space. Dynamics that takes place 
across regimes can be associated with structural change, for it is the ‘model of growth’ that is 
changing, not just its quantitative properties. 
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Empirics of growth: the data 
A sector or global path is traced as a sequence of dated states, or pairs of co-ordinate values in 
the Framework Space. States are dated according to a ‘clock’, a device defining 
conventionally the relevant time horizon. The criteria to carry this out are here the 
macroeconomic business cycle, measured by the time span between peak and trough values of 
the GDP growth rate. This ‘clock’ is employed to generate a uniform periodisation across 
sector dynamics. 
An automated procedure to detect these peaks and trough in GDP series is used. Algorithms 
have been written in STATA programming code. 
Dating Algorithm 
The first non-parametric procedure consists in determining graphically the relevant peaks and 
troughs. Although not sufficient, this procedure can prove very fruitful as a primary filter. For 
the most part, non-parametric procedures in turning point dating are based on recognition 
pattern algorithms (Bry and Boschan, 1977). Such algorithms need to perform the following 
tasks: 
1. Outliers should be disregarded: outliers are defined as values below or above three times 
the standard deviations. 
2. Irregular movements in the series should be excluded. 
3. Determination of a potential set of turning points. 
4. A procedure for ensuring that peaks and troughs alternate. 
5. A set of rules that re-combine the turning points established after steps three and four in 
order to satisfy pre-determined criteria concerning the duration and amplitude of phases and 
complete cycles. 
The predetermined criteria involved in the fifth step of this previous algorithm are referred to 
as censoring rules. The main censoring rules concern the duration of phases and cycles. We 
did not impose a minimal duration censuring rules on business cycle length (peak to peak), 
but we impose that a phase (expansion or recession) be at least six month (2 quarters). 
Moreover, we have considered some other censoring rules have been considered. Particularly, 
in the presence of a double turning point, the highest (lowest) turning point has been chosen. 
Data used 
We use OECD Economic Outlook quarterly series 77 available online at . Series for Italy 
were completed from OECD Main Economic Indicator series for investments. We intra-
polated between observed when values were unobserved, but did not extrapolate.  
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Mean and Standard Deviations of Annual Growth Rate of GDP, Employment and Investment, by country (1961-2005) 
  Mean Annual Growth Rate (%)  Standard deviation of Annual Growth rate (%)  Coefficient of variation (σ/µ) 
  GDP                 
                 
EMP INV GDP EMP INV GDP EMP INV
Australia  3.50 1.90 4.60 2.50 1.60 7.40 0.71 0.84 1.61
Belgium  2.80                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
0.40 3.00 2.00 1.00 6.90 0.71 2.50 2.30
Canada  3.30 2.10 4.80 2.20 1.80 9.80 0.67 0.86 2.04
Denmark  1.90 0.50 3.80 2.20 1.30 12.10 1.16 2.60 3.18
Finland  3.10 0.30 1.50 3.00 2.40 12.60 0.97 8.00 8.40
France  2.70 0.50 3.30 1.70 0.90 5.20 0.63 1.80 1.58
Germany  2.50 0.30 1.30 2.10 1.30 6.40 0.84 4.33 4.92
Ireland  4.90 1.30 4.80 3.00 2.30 14.20 0.61 1.77 2.96
Italy  2.80 0.20 1.50 2.30 1.30 4.30 0.82 6.50 2.87
Japan  4.30 0.80 5.40 3.60 0.90 8.80 0.84 1.13 1.63
Netherlands  3.00 1.20 2.70 2.20 1.20 7.40 0.73 1.00 2.74
Portugal  3.70 1.00 2.70 3.20 1.90 8.90 0.86 1.90 3.30
Switzerland  1.50 0.70 1.70 2.40 1.80 4.60 1.60 2.57 2.71
United Kingdom  2.40 0.20 3.40 1.80 1.60 6.50 0.75 8.00 1.91
United States  3.30 1.70 5.20 2.10 1.30 6.90 0.64 0.76 1.33
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